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1. INTRODUCTION 
Andrei Kolmogorov's Grundbegriffe der Wahr 
scheinlichkeitsrechnung, which set out the axiomatic 
basis for modern probability theory, appeared in 1933. 
Four years later, in his opening address to an interna 
tional colloquium at the University of Geneva, Maurice 
Fr?chet praised Kolmogorov for organizing a theory 
?mile Borel had created many years earlier by com 
bining countable additivity with classical probability. 
Fr?chet (1938b, page 54) put the matter this way in the 
written version of his address 
It was at the moment when Mr. Borel in 
troduced this new kind of additivity into the 
calculus of probability?in 1909, that is to 
say?that all the elements needed to for 
mulate explicitly the whole body of axioms 
of (modernized classical) probability theory 
came together. 
It is not enough to have all the ideas in 
mind, to recall them now and then; one must 
make sure that their totality is sufficient, 
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bring them together explicitly, and take re 
sponsibility for saying that nothing further 
is needed in order to construct the theory. 
This is what Mr. Kolmogorov did. This 
is his achievement. (And we do not believe 
he wanted to claim any others, so far as the 
axiomatic theory is concerned.) 
Perhaps not everyone in Fr?chet's audience agreed that 
Borel had put everything on the table, but surely many 
saw the Grundbegriffe as a work of synthesis. In Kol 
mogorov's axioms and in his way of relating his ax 
ioms to the world of experience, they must have seen 
traces of the work of many others?the work of Borel, 
yes, but also the work of Fr?chet himself, and that 
of Cantelli, Chuprov, Levy, Steinhaus, Ulam and von 
Mises. 
Today, what Fr?chet and his contemporaries knew 
is no longer known. We know Kolmogorov and what 
came after; we have mostly forgotten what came be 
fore. This is the nature of intellectual progress, but it 
has left many modern students with the impression that 
Kolmogorov's axiomatization was born full grown? 
a sudden brilliant triumph over confusion and chaos. 
To understand the synthesis represented by the 
Grundbegriffe, we need a broad view of the founda 
tions of probability and the advance of measure the 
ory from 1900 to 1930. We need to understand how 
measure theory became more abstract during those 
decades, and we need to recall what others were saying 
about axioms for probability, about Cournot's principle 
and about the relationship of probability with meas 
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ure and frequency. Our review of these topics draws 
mainly on work by authors listed by Kolmogorov 
in the Grundbegriffe's bibliography, especially Sergei 
Bernstein, Emile Borel, Francesco Cantelli, Maurice 
Fr?chet, Paul Levy, Antoni Lomnicki, Evgeny Slutsky, 
Hugo Steinhaus and Richard von Mises. 
We are interested not only in Kolmogorov's math 
ematical formalism, but also in his philosophy of 
probability?how he proposed to relate the mathemat 
ical formalism to the real world. In a letter to Fr?chet, 
Kolmogorov (1939) wrote, "You are also right in at 
tributing to me the opinion that the formal axioma 
tization should be accompanied by an analysis of its 
real meaning." Kolmogorov devoted only two pages of 
the Grundbegriffe to such an analysis, but the ques 
tion was more important to him than this brevity might 
suggest. We can study any mathematical formalism we 
like, but we have the right to call it probability only if 
we can explain how it relates to the phenomena classi 
cally treated by probability theory. 
We begin by looking at the classical foundation that 
Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic foundation replaced: 
equally likely cases. In Section 2 we review how proba 
bility was defined in terms of equally likely cases, how 
the rules of the calculus of probability were derived 
from this definition and how this calculus was related 
to the real world by Cournot's principle. We also look 
at some paradoxes discussed at the time. 
In Section 3 we sketch the development of measure 
theory and its increasing entanglement with probability 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century. 
This story centers on Borel, who introduced countable 
additivity into pure mathematics in the 1890s and then 
brought it to the center of probability theory, as Fr?chet 
noted, in 1909, when he first stated and more or less 
proved the strong law of large numbers for coin toss 
ing. However, the story also features Lebesgue, Radon, 
Fr?chet, Daniell, Wiener, Steinhaus and Kolmogorov 
himself. 
Inspired partly by Borel and partly by the challenge 
issued by Hubert in 1900, a whole series of mathe 
maticians proposed abstract frameworks for probabil 
ity during the three decades we are emphasizing. In 
Section 4 we look at some of these, beginning with 
the doctoral dissertations by Rudolf Laemmel and Ugo 
Broggi in the first decade of the century and including 
an early contribution by Kolmogorov, written in 1927, 
five years before he started work on the Grundbegriffe. 
In Section 5 we finally turn to the Grundbegriffe it 
self. Our review of it will confirm what Fr?chet said 
in 1937 and what Kolmogorov says in the preface: it 
was a 
synthesis and a manual, not a report on new re 
search. Like any textbook, its mathematics was novel 
for most of its readers, but its real originality was 
rhetorical and philosophical. 
2. THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATION 
The classical foundation of probability theory, which 
begins with the notion of equally likely cases, held 
sway for 200 years. Its elements were put in place early 
in the eighteenth century, and they remained in place 
in the early twentieth century. Even today the classical 
foundation is used in teaching probability. 
Although twentieth century proponents of new ap 
proaches were fond of deriding the classical foundation 
as naive or circular, it can be defended. Its basic math 
ematics can be explained in a few words, and it can 
be related to the real world by Cournot's principle, the 
principle that an event with small or zero probability 
will not occur. This principle was advocated in France 
and Russia in the early years of the twentieth century, 
but disputed in Germany. Kolmogorov retained it in the 
Grundbegriffe. 
In this section we review the mathematics of equally 
likely cases and recount the discussion of Cournot's 
principle, contrasting the support for it in France with 
German efforts to find other ways to relate equally 
likely cases to the real world. We also discuss two para 
doxes, contrived at the end of the nineteenth century 
by Joseph Bertrand, which illustrate the care that must 
be taken with the concept of relative probability. The 
lack of consensus on how to make philosophical sense 
of equally likely cases and the confusion revealed by 
Bertrand's paradoxes were two sources of dissatisfac 
tion with the classical theory. 
2.1 The Classical Calculus 
The classical definition of probability was formu 
lated by Jacob Bernoulli (1713) in Ars Conjectandi 
and Abraham de Moivre in (1718) in The Doctrine of 
Chances', the probability of an event is the ratio of the 
number of equally likely cases that favor it to the to 
tal number of equally likely cases possible under the 
circumstances. 
From this definition, de Moivre derived two rules for 
probability. The theorem of total probability, or the ad 
dition theorem, says that if A and B cannot both hap 
pen, then 
probability of A or B happening 
# of cases favoring A or B 
total # of cases 
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# of cases favoring A # of cases favoring B 
total # of cases total # of cases 
= (probability of A) + (probability of B). 
The theorem of compound probability, or the multipli 
cation theorem, says 
probability of both A and B happening 
# of cases favoring both A and B 
total # of cases 
# of cases favoring A 
total # of cases 
# of cases favoring both A and B 
# of cases favoring A 
? (probability of A) 
(probability of B if A happens). 
These arguments were still standard fare in probability 
textbooks at the beginning of the twentieth century, in 
cluding the great treatises by Henri Poincar? (1896) in 
France, Andrei Markov (1900) in Russia and Emanuel 
Czuber (1903) in Germany. Some years later we find 
them in Guido Castelnuovo's (1919) Italian textbook, 
which has been held out as the acme of the genre 
(Onicescu, 1967). 
Geometric probability was incorporated into the 
classical theory in the early nineteenth century. Instead 
of counting equally likely cases, one measures their 
geometric extension?their area or volume. However, 
probability is still a ratio, and the rules of total and 
compound probability are still theorems. This was ex 
plained by Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1843, page 29) 
in his influential treatise on probability and statistics, 
Exposition de la th?orie des chances et des probabil 
it?s. This understanding of geometric probability did 
not change in the early twentieth century, when Borel 
and Lebesgue expanded the class of sets for which 
we can define geometric extension. We may now have 
more events with which to work, but we define and 
study geometric probabilities as before. Cournot would 
have seen nothing novel in Felix Hausdorff's (1914, 
pages 416-417) definition of probability in the chapter 
on measure theory in his treatise on set theory. 
The classical calculus was enriched at the beginning 
of the twentieth century by a formal and universal no 
tation for relative probabilities. Hausdorff (1901) intro 
duced the symbol pp (E) for what he called the relative 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von E, p?sito F (relative probabil 
ity of E given F). Hausdorff explained that this nota 
tion can be used for any two events E and F, no matter 
what their temporal or logical relationship, and that it 
allows one to streamline Poincar?'s proofs of the ad 
dition and multiplication theorems. Hausdorff's nota 
tion was adopted by Czuber in 1903. Kolmogorov used 
it in the Grundbegriffe, and it persisted, especially in 
the German literature, until the middle of the twenti 
eth century, when it was displaced by the more flexible 
P(E\F), which Harold Jeffreys (1931) introduced in 
his Scientific Inference. 
2.2 Cournot's Principle 
An event with very small probability is morally im 
possible: it will not happen. Equivalently, an event with 
very high probability is morally certain: it will hap 
pen. This principle was first formulated within math 
ematical probability by Jacob Bernoulli. In his Ars 
Conjectandi, published in 1713, Bernoulli proved a 
celebrated theorem: in a sufficiently long sequence of 
independent trials of an event, there is a very high prob 
ability that the frequency with which the event happens 
will be close to its probability. Bernoulli explained that 
we can treat the very high probability as moral cer 
tainty and so use the frequency of the event as an esti 
mate of its probability. 
Probabilistic moral certainty was widely discussed 
in the eighteenth century. In the 1760s, the French sa 
vant Jean d'Alembert muddled matters by questioning 
whether the prototypical event of very small probabil 
ity, a long run of many happenings of an event as likely 
to fail as happen on each trial, is possible at all. A run of 
a hundred may be metaphysically possible, he felt, but 
it is physically impossible. It has never happened and 
never will happen (d'Alembert, 1761, 1767; Daston, 
1979). Buffon (1777) argued that the distinction be 
tween moral and physical certainty is one of degree. 
An event with probability 9999/10,000 is morally cer 
tain; an event with much greater probability, such as 
the rising of the sun, is physically certain (Loveland, 
2001). 
Cournot, a mathematician now remembered as an 
economist and a philosopher of science (Martin, 1996, 
1998), gave the discussion a nineteenth century cast. 
Being equipped with the idea of geometric probabil 
ity, Cournot could talk about probabilities that are van 
ishingly small. He brought physics to the foreground. 
It may be mathematically possible, he argued, for a 
heavy cone to stand in equilibrium on its vertex, but 
it is physically impossible. The event's probability is 
vanishingly small. Similarly, it is physically impossi 
ble for the frequency of an event in a long sequence of 
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trials to differ substantially from the event's probability 
(Cournot, 1843, pages 57 and 106). 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the prin 
ciple that an event with a vanishingly small probability 
will not happen took on a real role in physics, most 
saliently in Ludwig Boltzmann's statistical understand 
ing of the second law of thermodynamics. As Boltz 
mann explained in the 1870s, dissipative processes 
are irreversible because the probability of a state with 
entropy far from the maximum is vanishingly small 
(von Plato, 1994, page 80; Seneta, 1997). Also notable 
was Henri Poincar?'s use of the principle in celes 
tial mechanics. Poincar?'s (1890) recurrence theorem 
says that an isolated mechanical system confined to a 
bounded region of its phase space will eventually re 
turn arbitrarily close to its initial state, provided only 
that this initial state is not exceptional. The states for 
which the recurrence does not hold are exceptional 
inasmuch as they are contained in subregions whose 
total volume is arbitrarily small. 
Saying that an event of very small or vanishingly 
small probability will not happen is one thing. Saying 
that probability theory gains empirical meaning only 
by ruling out the happening of such events is another. 
Cournot (1843, page 78) seems to have been the first to 
say explicitly that probability theory does gain empir 
ical meaning only by declaring events of vanishingly 
small probability to be impossible: 
... The physically impossible event is there 
fore the one that has infinitely small proba 
bility, and only this remark gives 
substance?objective and phenomenal 
value?to the theory of mathematical prob 
ability. 
[The phrase "objective and phenomenal" refers to 
Kant's distinction between the noumenon, or thing 
in-itself, and the phenomenon, or object of experi 
ence (Daston, 1994).] After the Second World War, 
some authors began to use "Cournot's principle" for 
the principle that an event of very small or zero proba 
bility singled out in advance will not happen, especially 
when this principle is advanced as the unique means by 
which a probability model is given empirical meaning. 
2.2.1 The viewpoint of the French probabilists. In 
the early decades of the twentieth century, probabil 
ity theory was beginning to be understood as pure 
mathematics. What does this pure mathematics have 
to do with the real world? The mathematicians who 
revived research in probability theory in France dur 
ing these decades, Emile Borel, Jacques Hadamard, 
Maurice Fr?chet and Paul Levy, made the connection 
by treating events of small or zero probability as im 
possible. 
Borel explained this repeatedly, often in a style more 
literary than mathematical or philosophical (Borel, 
1906, 1909b, 1914, 1930). Borel's many discussions 
of the considerations that go into assessing the bound 
aries of practical certainty culminated in a classifica 
tion more refined than Buffon's. A probability of 10-6, 
he decided, is negligible at the human scale, a proba 
bility of 10-15 at the terrestrial scale and a probability 
of 10-50 at the cosmic scale (Borel, 1939, pages 6-7). 
Hadamard, the preeminent analyst who did path 
breaking work on Markov chains in the 1920s (Bru, 
2003), made the point in a different way. Probabil 
ity theory, he said, is based on two notions: the no 
tion of perfectly equivalent (equally likely) events and 
the notion of a very unlikely event (Hadamard, 1922, 
page 289). Perfect equivalence is a mathematical as 
sumption which cannot be verified. In practice, equiva 
lence is not perfect?one of the grains in a cup of sand 
may be more likely than another to hit the ground first 
when they are thrown out of the cup?but this need not 
prevent us from applying the principle of the very un 
likely event. Even if the grains are not exactly the same, 
the probability of any particular one hitting the ground 
first is negligibly small. Hadamard was the teacher of 
both Fr?chet and Levy. 
Among the French mathematicians of this period, it 
was Levy who expressed most clearly the thesis that 
Cournot's principle is probability's only bridge to re 
ality. In his Calcul des probabilit?s (Levy, 1925) Levy 
emphasized the different roles of Hadamard's two no 
tions. The notion of equally likely events, Levy ex 
plained, suffices as a foundation for the mathematics of 
probability, but so long as we base our reasoning only 
on this notion, our probabilities are merely subjective. 
It is the notion of a very unlikely event that permits the 
results of the mathematical theory to take on practical 
significance (Levy, 1925, pages 21, 34; see also Levy, 
1937, page 3). Combining the notion of a very unlikely 
event with Bernoulli's theorem, we obtain the notion 
of the objective probability of an event, a physical con 
stant that is measured by frequency. Objective proba 
bility, in Levy's view, is entirely analogous to length 
and weight, other physical constants whose empirical 
meaning is also defined by methods established for 
measuring them to a reasonable approximation (Levy, 
1925, pages 29-30). 
By the time he undertook to write the Grundbe 
griffe, Kolmogorov must have been very familiar with 
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Levy's views. He had cited Levy's 1925 book in his 
1931 article on Markov processes and subsequently, 
during his visit to France, had spent a great deal of 
time talking with Levy about probability. He could 
also have learned about Cournot's principle from the 
Russian literature. The champion of the principle in 
Russia had been Chuprov, who became professor of 
statistics in Petersburg in 1910. Chuprov put Cournot's 
principle?which he called Cournot's lemma?at the 
heart of this project; it was, he said, a basic principle 
of the logic of the probable (Chuprov, 1910; Sheynin, 
1996, pages 95-96). Markov, who also worked in Pe 
tersburg, learned about the burgeoning field of mathe 
matical statistics from Chuprov (Ondar, 1981), and we 
see an echo of Cournot's principle in Markov's (1912, 
page 12 of the German edition) textbook: 
The closer the probability of an event is 
to one, the more reason we have to expect 
the event to happen and not to expect its op 
posite to happen. 
In practical questions, we are forced to 
regard as certain events whose probability 
comes more or less close to one, and to re 
gard as impossible events whose probability 
is small. 
Consequently, one of the most important 
tasks of probability theory is to identify 
those events whose probabilities come close 
to one or zero. 
The Russian statistician Evgeny Slutsky discussed 
Chuprov's views in his influential article on limit the 
orems (Slutsky, 1925). Kolmogorov included Levy's 
book and Slutsky's article in his bibliography, but 
not Chuprov's book. An opponent of the Bolsheviks, 
Chuprov was abroad when they seized power, and he 
never returned home. He remained active in Sweden 
and Germany, but his health soon failed, and he died 
in 1926 at the age of 52. 
2.2.2 Strong and weak forms ofCournot's principle. 
Cournot's principle has many variations. Like proba 
bility, moral certainty can be subjective or objective. 
Some authors make moral certainty sound truly equiv 
alent to absolute certainty; others emphasize its prag 
matic meaning. 
For our story, it is important to distinguish between 
the strong and weak forms of the principle (Fr?chet, 
1951, page 6; Martin, 2003). The strong form refers to 
an event of small or zero probability that we single out 
in advance of a single trial: it says the event will not 
happen on that trial. The weak form says that an event 
with very small probability will happen very rarely in 
repeated trials. 
Borel, Levy and Kolmogorov all subscribed to 
Cournot's principle in its strong form. In this form, 
the principle combines with Bernoulli's theorem to 
produce the unequivocal conclusion that an event's 
probability will be approximated by its frequency in 
a particular sufficiently long sequence of independent 
trials. It also provides a direct foundation for statistical 
testing. If the meaning of probability resides precisely 
in the nonhappening of small-probability events sin 
gled out in advance, then we need no additional prin 
ciples to justify rejecting a hypothesis that gives small 
probability to an event we single out in advance and 
then observe to happen. 
Other authors, including Chuprov, enunciated Cour 
not's principle in its weak form, and this can lead in a 
different direction. The weak principle combines with 
Bernoulli's theorem to produce the conclusion that an 
event's probability will usually be approximated by 
its frequency in a sufficiently long sequence of inde 
pendent trials, a general principle that has the weak 
principle as a special case. This was pointed out in 
the famous textbook by Castelnuovo (1919, page 108). 
On page 3, Castelnuovo called the general principle the 
empirical law of chance: 
In a series of trials repeated a large num 
ber of times under identical conditions, each 
of the possible events happens with a (rel 
ative) frequency that gradually equals its 
probability. The approximation usually im 
proves as the number of trials increases. 
Although the special case where the probability is close 
to 1 is sufficient to imply the general principle, Castel 
nuovo preferred to begin his introduction to the mean 
ing of probability by enunciating the general principle, 
and so he can be considered a frequentist. His approach 
was influential. Maurice Fr?chet and Maurice Halb 
wachs adopted it in their textbook in 1924. It brought 
Fr?chet to the same understanding of objective proba 
bility as Levy: objective probability is a physical con 
stant that is measured by frequency (Fr?chet, 1938a, 
page 5; 1938b, pages 45-46). 
The weak point of Castelnuovo and Fr?chet's po 
sition lies in the modesty of their conclusion: they 
conclude only that an event's probability is usually ap 
proximated by its frequency. When we estimate a prob 
ability from an observed frequency, we are taking a 
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further step: we are assuming that what usually hap 
pens has happened in the particular case. This step 
requires the strong form of Cournot's principle. Ac 
cording to Kolmogorov (1956, page 240 of the 1965 
English edition), it is a reasonable step only if we have 
some reason to assume that the position of the partic 
ular case among other potential ones "is a regular one, 
that is, that it has no special features." 
2.2.3 British indifference and German skepticism. 
The mathematicians who worked on probability in 
France in the early twentieth century were unusual in 
the extent to which they delved into the philosophical 
side of their subject. Poincar? had made a mark in the 
philosophy of science as well as in mathematics, and 
Borel, Fr?chet and Levy tried to emulate him. The sit 
uation in Britain and Germany was different. 
In Britain there was little mathematical work in 
probability proper in this period. In the nineteenth 
century, British interest in probability had been practi 
cal and philosophical, not mathematical (Porter, 1986, 
page 74ff). Robert Leslie Ellis (1849) and John Venn 
(1888) accepted the usefulness of probability, but in 
sisted on defining it directly in terms of frequency, 
leaving no role for Bernoulli's theorem and Cournot's 
principle (Daston, 1994). These attitudes persisted 
even after Pearson and Fisher brought Britain into a 
leadership role in mathematical statistics. The British 
statisticians had no puzzle to solve concerning how to 
link probability to the world. They were interested in 
reasoning directly about frequencies. 
In contrast with Britain, Germany did see a substan 
tial amount of mathematical work in probability dur 
ing the first decades of the twentieth century, much of 
it published in German by Scandinavians and eastern 
Europeans, but few German mathematicians of the first 
rank fancied themselves philosophers. The Germans 
were already pioneering the division of labor to which 
we are now accustomed, between mathematicians who 
prove theorems about probability, and philosophers, 
logicians, statisticians and scientists who analyze the 
meaning of probability. Many German statisticians be 
lieved that one must decide what level of probabil 
ity will count as practical certainty in order to apply 
probability theory (von Bortkiewicz, 1901, page 825; 
Bohlmann, 1901, page 861), but German philosophers 
did not give Cournot's principle a central role. 
The most cogent and influential of the German 
philosophers who discussed probability in the late 
nineteenth century was Johannes von Kries (1886), 
whose Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung 
first appeared in 1886. von Kries rejected what he 
called the orthodox philosophy of Laplace and the 
mathematicians who followed him. As von Kries saw 
it, these mathematicians began with a subjective con 
cept of probability, but then claimed to establish the 
existence of objective probabilities by means of a so 
called law of large numbers, which they erroneously 
derived by combining Bernoulli's theorem with the be 
lief that small probabilities can be neglected. Having 
both subjective and objective probabilities at their dis 
posal, these mathematicians then used Bayes' theorem 
to reason about objective probabilities for almost any 
question where many observations are available. All 
this, von Kries believed, was nonsense. The notion that 
an event with very small probability is impossible was, 
in von Kries' eyes, simply d'Alembert's mistake. 
von Kries believed that objective probabilities some 
times exist, but only under conditions where equally 
likely cases can legitimately be identified. Two condi 
tions, he thought, are needed: 
Each case is produced by equally many of the pos 
sible arrangements of the circumstances, and this 
remains true when we look back in time to earlier 
circumstances that led to the current ones. In this 
sense, the relative sizes of the cases are natural. 
Nothing besides these circumstances affects our ex 
pectation about the cases. In this sense, the Spiel 
r?ume are insensitive. [In German, Spiel means 
game or play, and Raum (plural R?ume) means 
room or space. In most contexts, Spielraum can be 
translated as leeway or room for maneuver. For von 
Kries the Spielraum for each case was the set of all 
arrangements of the circumstances that produce it.] 
von Kries' principle of the Spielr?ume was that objec 
tive probabilities can be calculated from equally likely 
cases when these conditions are satisfied. He consid 
ered this principle analogous to Kant's principle that 
everything that exists has a cause. Kant thought that 
we cannot reason at all without the principle of cause 
and effect, von Kries thought that we cannot reason 
about objective probabilities without the principle of 
the Spielr?ume. 
Even when an event has an objective probability, 
von Kries saw no legitimacy in the law of large num 
bers. Bernoulli's theorem is valid, he thought, but it 
tells us only that a large deviation of an event's fre 
quency from its probability is just as unlikely as some 
other unlikely event, say a long run of successes. What 
will actually happen is another matter. This disagree 
ment between Cournot and von Kries can be seen as 
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a quibble about words. Do we say that an event will 
not happen (Cournot) or do we say merely that it is 
as unlikely as some other event we do not expect to 
happen (von Kries)? Either way, we proceed as if it 
will not happen. However, the quibbling has its rea 
sons. Cournot wanted to make a definite prediction, be 
cause this provides a bridge from probability theory to 
the world of phenomena?the real world, as those who 
have not studied Kant would say. von Kries thought he 
had a different way to connect probability theory with 
phenomena. 
von Kries' critique of moral certainty and the law 
of large numbers was widely accepted in Germany 
(Kamlah, 1983). Czuber, in the influential textbook we 
have already mentioned, named Bernoulli, d'Alembert, 
Buff on and De Morgan as advocates of moral certainty 
and declared them all wrong; the concept of moral cer 
tainty, he said, violates the fundamental insight that 
an event of ever so small a probability can still hap 
pen (Czuber, 1843, page 15; see also Meinong, 1915, 
page 591). 
This wariness about ruling out the happening of 
events whose probability is merely very small does 
not seem to have prevented acceptance of the idea that 
zero probability represents impossibility. Beginning 
with Wiman's work on continued fractions in 1900, 
mathematicians writing in German worked on show 
ing that various sets have measure zero, and everyone 
understood that the point was to show that these sets 
are impossible (see Felix Bernstein, 1912, page 419). 
This suggests a great gulf between zero probability and 
merely small probability. One does not sense such a 
gulf in the writings of Borel and his French colleagues; 
as we have seen, the vanishingly small, for them, was 
merely an idealization of the very small. 
von Kries' principle of the Spielr?ume did not en 
dure, because no one knew how to use it, but his 
project of providing a Kantian justification for the uni 
form distribution of probabilities remained alive in 
German philosophy in the first decades of the twenti 
eth century (Meinong, 1915; Reichenbach, 1916). John 
Maynard Keynes (1921) brought it into the English lit 
erature, where it continues to echo, to the extent that 
today's probabilists, when asked about the philosophi 
cal grounding of the classical theory of probability, are 
more likely to think about arguments for a uniform dis 
tribution of probabilities than about Cournot's princi 
ple. 
2.3 Bertrand's Paradoxes 
How do we know cases are equally likely, and when 
something happens, do the cases that remain possi 
ble remain equally likely? In the decades before the 
Grundbegriffe, these questions were frequently dis 
cussed in the context of paradoxes formulated by 
Joseph Bertrand, an influential French mathematician, 
in a textbook published in 1889. 
We now look at discussions by other authors of two 
of Bertrand's paradoxes: Poincar?'s discussion of the 
paradox of the three jewelry boxes and Borel's discus 
sion of the paradox of the great circle. (In the literature 
of the period, "Bertrand's paradox" usually referred 
to a third paradox, concerning two possible interpre 
tations of the idea of choosing a random chord on a 
circle. Determining a chord by choosing two random 
points on the circumference is not the same as deter 
mining it by choosing a random distance from the cen 
ter and then a random orientation.) The paradox of the 
great circle was also discussed by Kolmogorov and is 
now sometimes called the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox. 
23.1 The paradox of the three jewelry boxes. This 
paradox, laid out by Bertrand (1889, pages 2-3), in 
volves three identical jewelry boxes, each with two 
drawers. Box A has gold medals in both drawers, box B 
has silver medals in both, and box C has a gold medal 
in one and a silver medal in the other. Suppose we 
choose a box at random. It will be box C with prob 
ability 1/3. Now suppose we open at random one of 
the drawers in the box we have chosen. There are two 
possibilities for what we find: 
We find a gold medal. In this case, only two possibil 
ities remain: the other drawer has a gold medal (we 
have chosen box A) or the other drawer has a silver 
medal (we have chosen box C). 
We find a silver medal. Here also, only two possibil 
ities remain: the other drawer has a gold medal (we 
have chosen box C) or the other drawer has a silver 
medal (we have chosen box B). 
Either way, it seems, there are now two cases, one of 
which is that we have chosen box C. So the probability 
that we have chosen box C is now 1/2. 
Bertrand himself did not accept the conclusion that 
opening the drawer would change the probability of 
having box C from 1/3 to 1/2, and Poincar? (1912, 
pages 26-27) gave an explanation: Suppose the draw 
ers in each box are labeled (where we cannot see) 
a and ?, and suppose the gold medal in box C is in 
drawer a. Then there are six equally likely cases for 
the drawer we open: 
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1. Box A, drawer a\ gold medal. 
2. Box A, drawer ?: gold medal. 
3. Box B, drawer a: silver medal. 
4. Box B, drawer ?: silver medal. 
5. Box C, drawer a: gold medal. 
6. Box C, drawer ?: silver medal. 
When we find a gold medal, say, in the drawer we have 
opened, three of these cases remain possible: case 1, 
case 2 and case 5. Of the three, only one favors our 
having our hands on box C, so the probability for box C 
is still 1/3. 
2.3.2 The paradox of the great circle. Bertrand 
(1889, pages 6-7) begins with a simple question: if we 
choose at random two points on the surface of a sphere, 
what is the probability that the distance between them 
is less than 10'? 
By symmetry, we can suppose that the first point is 
known. So one way to answer the question is to calcu 
late the proportion of a sphere's surface that lies within 
10' of a given point. This is 2.1 x 10~6. 
Bertrand also found a different answer. After fix 
ing the first point, he said, we can also assume that 
we know the great circle that connects the two points, 
because the possible chances are the same on great 
circles through the first point. There are 360 degrees? 
2160 arcs of 10' each?in this great circle. Only the 
points in the two neighboring arcs are within 10' of the 
first point, and so the probability sought is 2/2160, or 
9.3 x 10~4. This is many times larger than the prob 
ability found by the first method. Bertrand considered 
both answers equally valid, the original question being 
ill-posed. The concept of choosing points at random on 
a sphere was not, he said, sufficiently precise. 
In his own probability textbook Borel (1909b, pages 
100-104) explained that Bertrand was mistaken. 
Bertrand's first method, based on the assumption that 
equal areas on the sphere have equal chances of con 
taining the second point, is correct. His second method, 
based on the assumption that equal arcs on a great cir 
cle have equal chances of containing it, is incorrect. 
Writing M and Mf for the two points to be chosen at 
random on the sphere, Borel explained Bertrand's mis 
take as follows: 
... The error begins when, after fixing the 
point M and the great circle, one assumes 
that the probability of Mf being on a given 
arc of the great circle is proportional to the 
length of that arc. If the arcs have no width, 
then in order to speak rigorously, we must 
assign the value zero to the probability that 
M and M' are on the circle. In order to avoid 
this factor of zero, which makes any calcu 
lation impossible, one must consider a thin 
bundle of great circles all going through M, 
and then it is obvious that there is a greater 
probability for M' to be situated in a vicinity 
90 degrees from M than in the vicinity of M 
itself (Fig. 13). 
To give this argument practical content, Borel dis 
cussed how one might measure the longitude of a point 
on the surface of the earth. If we use astronomical ob 
servations, then we are measuring an angle, and er 
rors in the measurement of the angle correspond to 
wider distances on the ground at the equator than at 
the poles. If we instead use geodesic measurements, 
say with a line of markers on each of many meridians, 
then to keep the markers out of each other's way, we 
must make them thinner and thinner as we approach 
the poles. 
2.3.3 Appraisal. Poincar?, Borel and others who 
understood the principles of the classical theory were 
able to resolve the paradoxes that Bertrand contrived. 
Two principles emerge from the resolutions they of 
fered: 
The equally likely cases must be detailed enough 
to represent new information (e.g., we find a gold 
FIG. 1. Borel's Figure 13. 
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medal) in all relevant detail. The remaining equally 
likely cases will then remain equally likely. 
We may need to consider the real observed event of 
nonzero probability that is represented in an ideal 
ized way by an event of zero probability (e.g., a ran 
domly chosen point falls on a particular meridian). 
We should pass to the limit only after absorbing the 
new information. 
Not everyone found it easy to apply these principles, 
however, and the confusion surrounding the paradoxes 
was another source of dissatisfaction with the classical 
theory. 
3. MEASURE-THEORETIC PROBABILITY BEFORE 
THE GRUNDBEGRIFFE 
A discussion of the relationship between measure 
and probability in the first decades of the twentieth 
century must navigate many pitfalls, because measure 
theory itself evolved, beginning as a theory about the 
measurability of sets of real numbers and then becom 
ing more general and abstract. Probability theory fol 
lowed along, but since the meaning of measure was 
changing, we can easily misunderstand things said at 
the time about the relationship between the two theo 
ries. 
The development of theories of measure and inte 
gration during the late nineteenth and early twenti 
eth centuries has been studied extensively (Hawkins, 
1975; Pier, 1994a). Here we offer only a bare-bones 
sketch, beginning with Borel and Lebesgue, and touch 
ing on those steps that proved most significant for 
the foundations of probability. We discuss the work 
of Carath?odory, Radon, Fr?chet and Nikodym, who 
made measure primary and integral secondary, as well 
as the contrasting approach of Daniell, who took inte 
gration to be basic, and Wiener, who applied DanielPs 
methods to Brownian motion. Then we discuss Borel's 
strong law of large numbers, which focused attention 
on measure rather than on integration. After looking 
at Steinhaus' axiomatization of Borel's denumerable 
probability, we turn to Kolmogorov's use of measure 
theory in probability in the 1920s. 
3.1 Measure Theory from Borel to Fr?chet 
Emile Borel is considered the founder of measure 
theory. Whereas Peano and Jordan had extended the 
concept of length from intervals to a larger class of 
sets of real numbers by approximating the sets inside 
and outside with finite unions of intervals, Borel used 
countable unions. His motivation came from complex 
analysis. In his doctoral dissertation Borel (1895) stud 
ied certain series that were known to diverge on a 
dense set of points on a closed curve and hence, it was 
thought, could not be continued analytically into the 
region bounded by the curve. Roughly speaking, Borel 
discovered that the set of points where divergence oc 
curred, although dense, can be covered by a count 
able number of intervals with arbitrarily small total 
length. Elsewhere on the curve?almost everywhere, 
we would say now?the series does converge and so 
analytic continuation is possible (Hawkins, 1975, Sec 
tion 4.2). This discovery led Borel to a new theory of 
measurability for subsets of [0, 1] (Borel, 1898). 
Borel's innovation was quickly seized upon by Henri 
Lebesgue, who made it the basis for his powerful the 
ory of integration (Lebesgue, 1901). We now speak of 
Lebesgue measure on the real numbers R and on the 
n-dimensional space Rn, and of the Lebesgue integral 
in these spaces. We need not review Lebesgue's the 
ory, but we should mention one theorem, the precursor 
of the Radon-Nikodym theorem: any countably addi 
tive and absolutely continuous set function on the real 
numbers is an indefinite integral. This result first ap 
peared in (Lebesgue, 1904; Hawkins, 1975, page 145; 
Pier, 1994a, page 524). He generalized it to i?" in 1910 
(Hawkins, 1975, page 186). 
Waclaw Sierpi?ski (1918) gave an axiomatic treat 
ment of Lebesgue measure. In this note, important to 
us because of the use Hugo Steinhaus later made of it, 
Sierpi?ski characterized the class of Lebesgue measur 
able sets as the smallest class K of sets that satisfy the 
following conditions: 
I. For every set E in K, there is a nonnegative num 
ber ?(E) that will be its measure and will satisfy 
conditions II, III, IV and V. 
II. Every finite closed interval is in K and has its 
length as its measure. 
III. The class K is closed under finite and countable 
unions of disjoint elements, and ? is finitely and 
countably additive. 
IV. If E\ D E2, and E\ and E2 are in K, then E\ \ E2 
is in K. 
V. If E is in K and ?jl(E) = 0, then any subset of E is 
inK. 
An arbitrary class K that satisfies these conditions is 
not necessarily a field; there is no requirement that the 
intersection of two of KJs elements also be in K. 
Lebesgue's measure theory was first made abstract 
by Johann Radon (1913). Radon unified Lebesgue and 
Stieltjes integration by generalizing integration with 
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respect to Lebesgue measure to integration with respect 
to any countably additive set function on the Borel sets 
in Rn. The generalization included a version of the the 
orem of Lebesgue we just mentioned: if a countably 
additive set function g on Rn is absolutely continu 
ous with respect to another countably additive set func 
tion /, then g is an indefinite integral with respect to / 
(Hawkins, 1975, page 189). 
Constantin Carath?odory was also influential in 
drawing attention to measures on Euclidean spaces 
other than Lebesgue measure. Carath?odory (1914) 
gave axioms for outer measure in a g-dimensional 
space, derived the notion of measure and applied 
these ideas not only to Lebesgue measure on Euclid 
ean spaces, but also to lower dimensional measures 
on Euclidean space which assign lengths to curves, 
areas to surfaces and so forth (Hochkirchen, 1999). 
Carath?odory also recast Lebesgue's theory of integra 
tion to make measure even more fundamental; in his 
textbook (Carath?odory, 1918) on real functions, he 
defined the integral of a positive function on a subset 
of Rn as the (n + 1)-dimensional measure of the region 
between the subset and the function's graph (Bourbaki, 
1994, page 228). 
It was Fr?chet who first went beyond Euclidean 
space. Fr?chet (1915a, b) observed that much of 
Radon's reasoning does not depend on the assumption 
that one is working in Rn. One can reason in the same 
way in a much larger space, such as a space of func 
tions. Any space will do, so long as the countably addi 
tive set function is defined on a a -field of its subsets, as 
Radon had required. Fr?chet did not, however, manage 
to generalize Radon's theorem on absolute continuity 
to the fully abstract framework. This generalization, 
now called the Radon-Nikodym theorem, was obtained 
by Otton Nikodym fifteen years later (Nikodym, 1930). 
Did Fr?chet himself have probability in mind when 
he proposed a calculus that allows integration over 
function space? Probably so. An integral is a mean 
value. In a Euclidean space this might be a mean 
value with respect to a distribution of mass or electrical 
charge, but we cannot distribute mass or charge over a 
space of functions. The only thing we can imagine dis 
tributing over such a space is probability or frequency. 
However, Fr?chet thought of probability as an appli 
cation of mathematics, not as a branch of pure mathe 
matics itself, so he did not think he was axiomatizing 
probability theory. 
It was Kolmogorov who first called Fr?chet's theory 
a foundation for probability theory. He put the matter 
this way in the preface to the Grundbegriffe: 
... After Lebesgue's investigations, the anal 
ogy between the measure of a set and the 
probability of an event, as well as between 
the integral of a function and the mathe 
matical expectation of a random variable, 
was clear. This analogy could be extended 
further; for example, many properties of in 
dependent random variables are completely 
analogous to corresponding properties of 
orthogonal functions. But in order to base 
probability theory on this analogy, one still 
needed to liberate the theory of measure 
and integration from the geometric elements 
still in the foreground with Lebesgue. This 
liberation was accomplished by Fr?chet. 
It should not be inferred from this passage that Fr?chet 
and Kolmogorov used "measure" in the way we do 
today. Fr?chet may have liberated measure and inte 
gration from its geometric roots, but Fr?chet and Kol 
mogorov continued to reserve the word measure for 
geometric settings. Throughout the 1930s, what we 
now call a measure, they called an additive set func 
tion. The usage to which we are now accustomed be 
came standard only after the Second World War. 
3.2 Daniell's Integral and Wiener's 
Differential Space 
Percy Daniell, an Englishman working at the Rice 
Institute in Houston, Texas, introduced his integral in a 
series of articles (Daniell, 1918, 1919a, b, 1920) in the 
Annals of Mathematics. 
Like Fr?chet, Daniell considered an abstract set E, 
but instead of beginning with an additive set function 
on subsets of E, he began with what he called an in 
tegral on E?a linear operator on some class To of 
real-valued functions on E. The class To might con 
sist of all continuous functions (if E is endowed with 
a topology) or perhaps all step functions. Applying 
Lebesgue's methods in this general setting, Daniell ex 
tended the linear operator to a wider class T\ of func 
tions on E, the summable functions. In this way, the 
Riemann integral is extended to the Lebesgue integral, 
the Stieltjes integral is extended to the Radon integral 
and so on (Daniell, 1918). Using ideas from Fr?chet's 
dissertation, Daniell also gave examples in infinite 
dimensional spaces (Daniell, 1919a, b). Daniell (1921) 
even used his theory of integration to construct a theory 
of Brownian motion. However, he did not succeed in 
gaining recognition for this last contribution; it seems 
to have been completely ignored until Stephen Stigler 
spotted it in the 1970s (Stigler, 1973). 
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The American ex-child prodigy and polymath Nor 
bert Wiener, when he came upon Daniell's 1918 and 
July 1919 articles (Daniell, 1918, 1919a), was in a 
better position than Daniell himself to appreciate and 
advertise their remarkable potential for probability 
(Wiener, 1956; Masani, 1990). Having studied philos 
ophy as well as mathematics, Wiener was well aware 
of the intellectual significance of Brownian motion and 
of Einstein's mathematical model for it. 
In November 1919, Wiener submitted his first arti 
cle (Wiener, 1920) on Daniell's integral to the Annals 
of Mathematics, the journal where Daniell's four arti 
cles on it had appeared. This article did not yet dis 
cuss Brownian motion; it merely laid out a general 
method for setting up a Daniell integral when the un 
derlying space E is a function space. However, by Au 
gust 1920, Wiener was in France to explain his ideas 
on Brownian motion to Fr?chet and Levy (Segal, 1992, 
page 397). He followed up with a series of articles 
(Wiener, 1921a, b), including a later much celebrated 
article on 
"differential-space" (Wiener, 1923). 
Wiener's basic idea was simple. Suppose we want 
to formalize the notion of Brownian motion for a fi 
nite time interval, say 0 < t < 1. A realized path is a 
function on [0, 1]. We want to define mean values for 
certain functionals (real-valued functions of the real 
ized path). To set up a Daniell integral that gives these 
mean values, Wiener took To to consist of functionals 
that depend only on the path's values at a finite number 
of time points. One can find the mean value of such a 
functional using Gaussian probabilities for the changes 
from each time point to the next. Extending this in 
tegral by Daniell's method, he succeeded in defining 
mean values for a wide class of functionals. In particu 
lar, he obtained probabilities (mean values for indicator 
functions) for certain sets of paths. He showed that the 
set of continuous paths has probability 1, while the set 
of differentiable paths has probability 0. 
It is now commonplace to translate this work into 
Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic framework. Kiyoshi 
It?, for example, in a commentary published along 
with Wiener's articles from this period in Volume 1 
of Wiener's collected works (Wiener, 1976-1985, 
page 515), wrote as follows concerning Wiener's 1923 
article: 
Having investigated the differential space 
from various directions, Wiener defines the 
Wiener measure as a a-additive probability 
measure by means of Daniell's theory of in 
tegral. 
It should not be thought, however, that Wiener defined 
a a-additive probability measure and then found mean 
values as integrals with respect to that measure. Rather, 
as we just explained, he started with mean values and 
used Daniell's theory to obtain more. This Daniellian 
approach to probability, making mean value basic and 
probability secondary, has long taken a back seat to 
Kolmogorov's approach, but it still has its supporters 
(Haberman, 1996; Whittle, 2000). 
3.3 Borel's Denumerable Probability 
Impressive as it was and still is, Wiener's work 
played little role in the story leading to Kolmogorov's 
Grundbegriffe. The starring role was played instead by 
Borel. 
In retrospect, Borel's use of measure theory in com 
plex analysis in the 1890s already looks like proba 
bilistic reasoning. Especially striking in this respect 
is the argument Borel gave for his claim that a Tay 
lor series will usually diverge on the boundary of its 
circle of convergence (Borel, 1897). In general, he as 
serted, successive coefficients of the Taylor series, or 
at least successive groups of coefficients, are indepen 
dent. He showed that each group of coefficients de 
termines an arc on the circle, that the sum of lengths 
of the arcs diverges and that the Taylor series will 
diverge at a point on the circle if it belongs to infi 
nitely many of the arcs. The arcs being independent 
and the sum of their lengths being infinite, a given point 
must be in infinitely many of them. To make sense of 
this argument, we must evidently take "in general" to 
mean that the coefficients are chosen at random and 
take 
"independent" to mean probabilistically indepen 
dent; the conclusion then follows by what we now call 
the Borel-Cantelli lemma. Borel himself used proba 
bilistic language when he reviewed this work in 1912 
(Borel, 1912; Kahane, 1994). In the 1890s, however, 
Borel did not see complex analysis as a domain for 
probability, which is concerned with events in the real 
world. 
In the new century, Borel did begin to explore the im 
plications for probability of his and Lebesgue's work 
on measure and integration (Bru, 2001). His first com 
ments came in an article in 1905 (Borel, 1905), where 
he pointed out that the new theory justified Poincar?'s 
intuition that a point chosen at random from a line seg 
ment would be incommensurable with probability 1 
and called attention to Anders Wiman's (1900, 1901) 
work on continued fractions, which had been inspired 
by the question of the stability of planetary motions, as 
an application of measure theory to probability. 
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Then, in 1909, Borel published a startling result?his 
strong law of large numbers (Borel, 1909a). This new 
result strengthened measure theory's connection both 
with geometric probability and with the heart of clas 
sical probability theory?the concept of independent 
trials. Considered as a statement in geometric proba 
bility, the law says that the fraction of l's in the binary 
expansion of a real number chosen at random from 
[0, 1] converges to 
^ 
with probability 1. Considered as 
a statement about independent trials (we may use the 
language of coin tossing, though Borel did not), it says 
that the fraction of heads in a denumerable sequence of 
independent tosses of a fair coin converges to ^ with 
probability 1. Borel explained the geometric interpre 
tation and he asserted that the result can be established 
using measure theory (Borel, 1909a, Section 1.8). How 
ever, he set measure theory aside for philosophical 
reasons and provided an imperfect proof using denu 
merable versions of the rules of total and compound 
probability. It was left to others, most immediately 
Faber (1910, page 400) and Hausdorff (1914), to give 
rigorous measure-theoretic proofs (Doob, 1989, 1994; 
von Plato, 1994). 
Borel's discomfort with a measure-theoretic treat 
ment can be attributed to his unwillingness to as 
sume countable additivity for probability (Barone and 
Novikoff, 1978; von Plato, 1994). He saw no logi 
cal absurdity in a countably infinite number of zero 
probabilities adding to a nonzero probability, and so 
instead of general appeals to countable additivity he 
preferred arguments that derive probabilities as lim 
its as the number of trials increases (Borel, 1909a, 
Section 1.4). Such arguments seemed to him stronger 
than formal appeals to countable additivity, because 
they exhibit the finitary pictures that are idealized by 
the infinitary pictures. He saw even more fundamen 
tal problems in the idea that Lebesgue measure can 
model a random choice (von Plato, 1994, pages 36-56; 
Knobloch, 2001). How can we choose a real number at 
random when most real numbers are not even definable 
in any constructive sense? 
Although Hausdorff did not hesitate to equate Lebes 
gue measure with probability, his account of Borel's 
strong law, in his Grundz?ge der Mengenlehre (Haus 
dorff, 1914, pages 419-421), treated it as a theorem 
about real numbers: the set of numbers in [0, 1] with 
binary expansions for which the proportion of l's con 
verges to 
^ 
has Lebesgue measure 1. Later, Francesco 
Paolo Cantelli (1916a, b, 1917) rediscovered the strong 
law (he neglected, in any case, to cite Borel) and ex 
tended it to the more general result that the average of 
bounded random variables will converge to their mean 
with arbitrarily high probability. Cantelli's work in 
spired other authors to study the strong law and to sort 
out different concepts of probabilistic convergence. 
By the early 1920s, it seemed to some that there 
were two different versions of Borel's strong law? 
one concerned with real numbers and one concerned 
with probability. Hugo Steinhaus (1923) proposed to 
clarify matters by axiomatizing Borel's theory of de 
numerable probability along the lines of Sierpi?ski's 
axiomatization of Lebesgue measure. Writing A for 
the set of all infinite sequences of p's and 77's (p for 
"rouge" and rj for "noir"; now we are playing red or 
black rather than heads or tails), Steinhaus proposed 
the following axioms for a class ? of subsets of A and 
a real-valued function /x that gives probabilities for the 
elements of ?: 
I. /x(?)>0forall?e?. 
II. 1. For any finite sequence e of p's and 77's, the 
subset E of A consisting of all infinite se 
quences that begin with e is in &. 
2. If two such sequences e\ and e2 differ in only 
one place, then ?jl(E\) = ?(E2), where E\ and 
E2 are the corresponding sets. 
3. ?(A) = \. 
III. ? is closed under finite and countable unions of 
disjoint elements, and ?jl is finitely and countably 
additive. 
IV. If E\ D E2, and E\ and E2 are in ?, then E\ \ E2 
is in ?. 
V If E is in ? and ?(E) ? 0, then any subset of E is 
in?. 
Sierpi?ski's axioms for Lebesgue measure consisted 
of I, III, IV and V, together with an axiom that says that 
the measure ?jl(J) of an interval J is its length. This 
last axiom being demonstrably equivalent to Steinhaus' 
axiom II, Steinhaus concluded that the theory of prob 
ability for an infinite sequence of binary trials is iso 
morphic with the theory of Lebesgue measure. 
To show that his axiom II is equivalent to setting the 
measures of intervals equal to their length, Steinhaus 
used the Rademacher functions?the nth Rademacher 
function being the function that assigns a real num 
ber the value 1 or ?1 depending on whether the nth 
digit in its dyadic expansion is 0 or 1. He also used 
these functions, which are independent random vari 
ables, in deriving Borel's strong law and related re 
sults. The work by Rademacher (1922) and Steinhaus 
marked the beginning of the Polish school of "indepen 
dent functions," which made important contributions to 
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probability theory during the period between the wars 
(Holgate, 1997). 
3.4 Kolmogorov Enters the Stage 
Although Steinhaus considered only binary trials 
in 1923, his reference to Borel's more general con 
cept of denumerable probability pointed to generaliza 
tions. We find such a generalization in Kolmogorov's 
first article on probability, co-authored by Khinchin 
(Khinchin and Kolmogorov, 1925), which showed that 
a series of discrete random variables y\ + yi H-will 
converge with probability 1 when the series of means 
and the series of variances both converge. The first sec 
tion of the article, due to Khinchin, spells out how to 
represent the random variables as functions on [0, 1]: 
divide the interval into segments with lengths equal 
to the probabilities for yi's possible values, then di 
vide each of these segments into smaller segments with 
lengths proportional to the probabilities for j2's possi 
ble values and so on. This, Khinchin noted with a nod 
to Rademacher and Steinhaus, reduces the problem to a 
problem about Lebesgue measure. This reduction was 
useful because the rules for working with Lebesgue 
measure were clear, while Borel's picture of denumer 
able probability remained murky. 
Dissatisfaction with this detour into Lebesgue mea 
sure must have been one impetus for the Grundbegriffe 
(Doob, 1989, page 818). Kolmogorov made no such 
detour in his next article on the convergence of sums 
of independent random variables. In this sole-authored 
article (Kolmogorov, 1928), he took probabilities and 
expected values as his starting point, but even then he 
did not appeal to Fr?chet's countably additive calcu 
lus. Instead, he worked with finite additivity and then 
stated an explicit ad hoc definition when he passed to 
a limit. For example, he defined the probability P that 
the series Y^?=\ 3^ converges by the equation 




where ffl(E) denotes the probability of the event E. 
[This formula does not appear in the Russian 
(Kolmogorov, 1986) and English (Kolmogorov, 1992) 
translations provided in Kolmogorov's collected 
works; there the argument has been modernized so as 
to eliminate it.] This recalls the way Borel proceeded 
in 1909: think through each passage to the limit. 
It was in his seminal article on Markov processes 
(Kolmogorov, 1931) that Kolmogorov first explicitly 
and freely used Fr?chet's calculus as his framework for 
probability. In this article, Kolmogorov considered a 
system with a set of states 21. For any two time points 
t\ and t2 (t\ < t2), any state x e 21 and any element (B in 
a collection # of subsets of 21, he wrote P(ii, x, t2, (?) 
for the probability, when the system is in state x at 
time t\, that it will be in a state in (? at time t2. Cit 
ing Fr?chet, Kolmogorov assumed that P is countably 
additive as a function of and that # is closed un 
der differences and countable unions, and contains the 
empty set, all singletons and 21. However, the focus was 
not on Fr?chet; it was on the equation that ties together 
the transition probabilities, now called the Chapman 
Kolmogorov equation. The article launched the study 
of this equation by purely analytical methods, a study 
that kept probabilists occupied for 50 years. 
As many commentators have noted, the 1931 arti 
cle makes no reference to probabilities for trajecto 
ries. There is no suggestion that such probabilities are 
needed for a stochastic process to be well defined. Con 
sistent transition probabilities, it seems, are enough. 
Bachelier (1900, 1910, 1912) is cited as the first to 
study continuous-time stochastic processes, but Wiener 
is not cited. 
4. HUBERT'S SIXTH PROBLEM 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, many 
mathematicians were dissatisfied with what they saw 
as a lack of clarity and rigor in the probability calcu 
lus. The whole calculus seemed to be concerned with 
concepts that lie outside mathematics: event, trial, ran 
domness, probability. As Henri Poincar? wrote, "one 
can hardly give a satisfactory definition of probability" 
(Poincar?, 1912, page 24). 
The most celebrated call for clarification came from 
David Hilbert. The sixth of the twenty-three open 
problems that Hilbert presented to the International 
Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900 was to 
treat axiomatically, after the model of geometry, those 
parts of physics in which mathematics already played 
an outstanding role, especially probability and me 
chanics (Hilbert, 1902; Hochkirchen, 1999). To explain 
what he meant by axioms for probability, Hilbert cited 
Georg Bohlmann, who had labeled the rules of total 
and compound probability axioms rather than theorems 
in his lectures on the mathematics of life insurance 
(Bohlmann, 1901). In addition to a logical investiga 
tion of these axioms, Hilbert called for a "rigorous and 
satisfactory development of the method of average val 
ues in mathematical physics, especially in the kinetic 
theory of gases." 
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Hubert's call for a mathematical treatment of aver 
age values was answered in part by the work on inte 
gration that we discussed in the preceding section, but 
his suggestion that the classical rules for probability 
should be treated as axioms on the model of geome 
try was an additional challenge. Among the early re 
sponses, we may mention the following: 
In his Z?rich dissertation, Rudolf Laemmel (1904) 
discussed the rules of total and compound prob 
ability as axioms, but he stated the rule of com 
pound probability only in the case of independence, 
a concept he did not explicate. (For excerpts, see 
Schneider, 1988, pages 359-366.) 
In his G?ttingen dissertation, directed by Hubert 
himself, Ugo Broggi (1907) gave only two axioms: 
an axiom stating that the sure event has probabil 
ity 1, and an axiom stating the rule of total probabil 
ity. Following tradition, he then defined probability 
as a ratio (a ratio of numbers of cases in the discrete 
setting; a ratio of the Lebesgue measures of two sets 
in the geometric setting) and verified his axioms. He 
did not state an axiom that corresponds to the clas 
sical rule of compound probability. Instead, he gave 
this name to a rule for calculating the probability of 
a Cartesian product, which he derived from the defi 
nition of geometric probability in terms of Lebesgue 
measure. (For excerpts, see Schneider, 1988, pages 
367-377.) Broggi mistakenly claimed that his axiom 
of total probability (finite additivity) implied count 
able additivity (Steinhaus, 1923). 
In an article written in 1920, published in 1923 
and listed in the bibliography of the Grundbegriffe, 
Antoni Lomnicki (1923) proposed that probability 
should always be understood relative to a density 
(p on a set M in Rr. Lomnicki defined this prob 
ability by combining two of Carath?odory's ideas: 
the idea of p-dimensional measure and the idea of 
defining the integral of a function on a set as the 
measure of the region between the set and the func 
tion's graph (see Section 3.1 above). The probabil 
ity of a subset m of M, according to Lomnicki, is 
the ratio of the measure of the region between m 
and 0's graph to the measure of the region between 
M and this graph. If M is an r-dimensional sub 
set of Rr, then the measure being used is Lebesgue 
measure on Rr+l; if M is a lower dimensional 
subset of Rr, say p-dimensional, then the measure 
is the (p + 1)-dimensional Carath?odory measure. 
This definition covers discrete as well as continu 
ous probability: in the discrete case, M is a set of 
discrete points, the function qb assigns each point 
its probability, and the region between a subset m 
and the graph of </> consists of a line segment for 
each point in m, whose Carath?odory measure is its 
length (i.e., the point's probability). The rule of total 
probability follows. Like Broggi, Lomnicki treated 
the rule of compound probability as a rule for re 
lating probabilities on a Cartesian product to proba 
bilities on its components. He did not consider it an 
axiom, because it holds only if the density itself is a 
product density. 
In an article published in Russian, Sergei Bernstein 
(1917) showed that probability theory can be foun 
ded on qualitative axioms for numerical coefficients 
that measure the probabilities of propositions. He 
also developed this idea in his probability text 
book (Bernstein, 1927), and Kolmogorov listed both 
the article and the book in the bibliography of 
the Grundbegriffe. John Maynard Keynes included 
Bernstein's article in the bibliography of his prob 
ability book (Keynes, 1921), but Bernstein's work 
was subsequently ignored by English-language au 
thors on qualitative probability. It was first sum 
marized in English in Samuel Kotz's translation of 
Leonid E. Maistrov's (1974) history of probability. 
We now discuss at greater length responses by 
von Mises, Slutsky, Kolmogorov and Cantelli. 
4.1 von Mises' Collectives 
The concept of a collective was introduced into 
the German scientific literature by Gustav Fechner's 
(1897) Kollektivmasslehre, which appeared ten years 
after the author's death. The concept was quickly taken 
up by Georg Helm (1902) and Heinrich Bruns (1906). 
Fechner wrote about the concept of a Kollektivgegen 
stand (collective object) or a Kollektivreihe (collective 
series). It was only later, in Meinong (1915) for ex 
ample, that we see these names abbreviated to Kollek 
tiv. As the name Kollektivreihe indicates, a Kollektiv 
is a population of individuals given in a certain order; 
Fechner called the ordering the U?iste. It was sup 
posed to be irregular?random, we would say. Fechner 
was a practical scientist, not concerned with the the 
oretical notion of probability, but as Helm and Bruns 
realized, probability theory provides a framework for 
studying collectives. 
The concept of a collective was developed by Richard 
von Mises (1919, 1928, 1931). His contribution was to 
realize that the concept can be made into a mathemat 
ical foundation for probability theory. As von Mises 
defined it, a collective is an infinite sequence of out 
comes that satisfies two axioms: 
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1. The relative frequency of each outcome converges 
to a real number (the probability of the outcome) as 
we look at longer and longer initial segments of the 
sequence. 
2. The relative frequency converges to the same prob 
ability in any subsequence selected without knowl 
edge of the future (we may use knowledge of the 
outcomes so far in deciding whether to include the 
next outcome in the subsequence). 
The second property says we cannot change the odds 
by selecting a subsequence of trials on which to bet; 
this is von Mises' version of the 
"hypothesis of the im 
possibility of a gambling system," and it assures the 
irregularity of the Ur?ste. 
According to von Mises, the purpose of the prob 
ability calculus is to identify situations where collec 
tives exist and the probabilities in them are known, and 
to derive probabilities for other collectives from these 
given probabilities. He pointed to three domains where 
probabilities for collectives are known: (1) games of 
chance where devices are carefully constructed so 
the axioms will be satisfied, (2) statistical phenom 
ena where the two axioms can be confirmed, to a rea 
sonable degree and (3) branches of theoretical physics 
where the two axioms play the same hypothetical role 
as other theoretical assumptions (von Mises, 1931, 
pages 25-27). 
von Mises derived the classical rules of probabil 
ity, such as the rules for adding and multiplying prob 
abilities, from rules for constructing new collectives 
from an initial one. He had several laws of large num 
bers. The simplest was his definition of probability: the 
probability of an event is the event's limiting frequency 
in a collective. Others arose as one constructed further 
collectives. 
The ideas of von Mises were taken up by a num 
ber of mathematicians in the 1920s and 1930s. Kol 
mogorov's bibliography includes an article by Arthur 
Copeland (1932) that proposed founding probability 
theory on particular rules for selecting subsequences 
in von Mises' scheme, as well as articles by Karl 
D?rge (1930), Hans Reichenbach (1932) and Erhard 
Tornier (1933) that argued for related schemes. But the 
most prominent mathematicians of the time, including 
the G?ttingen mathematicians (Mac Lane, 1995), the 
French probabilists and the British statisticians, were 
hostile or indifferent. 
Collectives were given a rigorous mathematical basis 
by Abraham Wald (1938) and Alonzo Church (1940), 
but the claim that they provide a foundation for prob 
ability was refuted by Jean Ville (1939). Ville pointed 
out that whereas a collective in von Mises' sense will 
not be vulnerable to a gambling system that chooses a 
subsequence of trials on which to bet, it may still be 
vulnerable to a more clever gambling system, which 
also varies the amount of the bet and the outcome on 
which to bet. 
4.2 Slutsky's Calculus of Valences and 
Kolmogorov's General Theory of Measure 
In an article published in Russian Evgeny Slutsky 
(1922) presented a viewpoint that greatly influenced 
Kolmogorov. As Kolmogorov (1948) said in an obit 
uary for Slutsky, Slutsky was "the first to give the right 
picture of the purely mathematical content of probabil 
ity theory." 
How do we make probability purely mathemati 
cal? Markov had claimed to do this in his textbook, 
but Slutsky did not think Markov had succeeded, be 
cause Markov had retained the subjective notion of 
equipossibility. The solution, Slutsky felt, was to re 
move both the word 
"probability" and the notion of 
equally likely cases from the theory. Instead of begin 
ning with equally likely cases, one should begin by as 
suming merely that numbers are assigned to cases and 
that when a case assigned the number a is further sub 
divided, the numbers assigned to the subcases should 
add to a. The numbers assigned to cases might be equal 
or they might not. The addition and multiplication the 
orems would be theorems in this abstract calculus, but 
it should not be called the probability calculus. In place 
of 
"probability," he suggested the unfamiliar word Ba 
jieHTHocTB, or "valence." (Laemmel had earlier used 
the German valenz.) Probability would be only one in 
terpretation of the calculus of valences, a calculus fully 
as abstract as group theory. 
Slutsky listed three distinct interpretations of the cal 
culus of valences: 
1. Classical probability (equally likely cases). 
2. Finite empirical sequences (frequencies). 
3. Limits of relative frequencies. (Slutsky remarked 
that this interpretation is particularly popular with 
the English school.) 
Slutsky did not think probability could be reduced to 
limiting frequency, because sequences of independent 
trials have properties that go beyond their possessing 
limiting frequencies. Initial segments of the sequences 
have properties that are not imposed by the eventual 
convergence of the frequency, and the sequences must 
be irregular in a way that resists the kind of selection 
discussed by von Mises. 
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Slutsky's idea that probability could be an instance 
of a broader abstract theory was taken up by Kol 
mogorov in a thought piece in Russian (Kolmogorov, 
1929), before his forthright use of Fr?chet's theory in 
his article on Markov processes in 1930 (Kolmogorov, 
1931). Whereas Slutsky had mentioned frequencies as 
an alternative interpretation of a general calculus, Kol 
mogorov pointed to more mathematical examples: the 
distribution of digits in the decimal expansions of ir 
rationals, Lebesgue measure in an n -dimensional cube 
and the density of a set A of positive integers (the limit 
as n -> oo of the fraction of the integers between 1 and 
n that are in A). 
The abstract theory Kolmogorov sketches is con 
cerned with a function M that assigns a nonnega 
tive number M(E) to each element E of a class of 
subsets of a set A. He called M(E) the measure 
(iviepa) of E and he called M a measure specification 
(ivtepoonpe^ejieHHe). So as to accommodate all the 
mathematical examples he had in mind, he assumed, in 
general, neither that M is countably additive nor that 
the class of subsets to which it assigns numbers is a 
field. Instead, he assumed only that when E\ and E2 
are disjoint and M assigns a number to two of the three 
sets E\, E2 and E\ U E2, it also assigns a number to 
the third, and that 
M(EX U E2) = M(EX) + M(E2) 
then holds (cf. Steinhaus' axioms III and IV). In the 
case of probability, however, he did suggest (using dif 
ferent words) that M should be countably additive and 
that the class of subsets to which it assigns numbers 
should be a field, for only then can we uniquely de 
fine probabilities for countable unions and intersec 
tions, and this seems necessary to justify arguments 
involving events such as the convergence of random 
variables. 
He defined the abstract Lebesgue integral of a func 
tion / on A, and he commented that countable ad 
ditivity is to be assumed whenever such an integral 
is discussed. He wrote MEl(E2) = M(E{E2)/M(Ei) 
"by analogy with the usual concept of relative proba 
bility." He defined independence for partitions, and he 
commented, no doubt in reference to Borel's strong law 
and other results in number theory, that the notion of 
independence is responsible for the power of probabi 
listic methods within pure mathematics. 
The mathematical core of the Grundbegriffe is alre 
ady here. Many years later, in his commentary in Vol 
ume II of his collected works (Kolmogorov, 1992, 
page 520), Kolmogorov said that only the set-theoretic 
treatment of conditional probability and the theory of 
distributions in infinite products were missing. Also 
missing, though, is the bold rhetorical move that 
Kolmogorov made in the Grundbegriffe?giving the 
abstract theory the name probability. 
4.3 The Axioms of Steinhaus and Ulam 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the city of Lwow in Poland 
was a vigorous center of mathematical research, led by 
Hugo Steinhaus. (Though it was in Poland between the 
two World Wars, Lwow is now in Ukraine. Its name 
is spelled differently in different languages: Lwow in 
Polish, Lviv in Ukrainian and Lvov in Russian. When 
part of Austria-Hungary and, briefly, Germany, it was 
Lemberg. Some articles in our bibliography refer to it 
as L?opol.) In 1929, Steinhaus' work on limit theorems 
intersected with Kolmogorov's, and his approach pro 
moted the idea that probability should be axiomatized 
in the style of measure theory. 
As we saw in Section 3.3, Steinhaus had already, 
in 1923, formulated axioms for heads and tails iso 
morphic to Sierpi?ski's axioms for Lebesgue measure. 
This isomorphism had more than a philosophical pur 
pose; Steinhaus used it to prove Borel's strong law. In 
a pair of articles written in 1929 and published in 1930 
(Steinhaus, 1930a, b), Steinhaus extended his approach 
to limit theorems that involved an infinite sequence of 
independent draws 0\, 62,... from the interval [0, 1]. 
His axioms for this case were the same as for the bi 
nary case (Steinhaus, 1930b, pages 22-23), except that 
the second axiom, which determines probabilities for 
initial finite sequences of heads and tails, was replaced 
by an axiom that determines probabilities for initial fi 
nite sequences 6\, 62,..., 0n : 
The probability that Q[ e 0/ for / = 1,..., n, 
where the 0/ are measurable subsets of 
[0, 1], is 
I?l|-I?2l"-I?nl, 
where |0/1 is the Lebesgue measure of 0/. 
Steinhaus presented his axioms as a "logical extra 
polation" of the classical axioms to the case of an infi 
nite number of trials (Steinhaus, 1930b, page 23). They 
were more or less tacitly used, he asserted, in all clas 
sical problems, such as the problem of the gambler's 
ruin, where the game as a whole?not merely finitely 
many rounds?must be considered (Steinhaus, 1930a, 
page 409). As in the case of heads and tails, Steinhaus 
showed that there are probabilities that uniquely satisfy 
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his axioms by setting up an isomorphism with Lebes 
gue measure on [0, 1], this time using a sort of Peano 
curve to map [0, 1]?? onto [0, 1]. He used the isomor 
phism to prove several limit theorems, including one 
that formalized Borel's 1897 claim concerning the 
circle of convergence of a Taylor series with randomly 
chosen coefficients. 
Steinhaus' axioms were measure-theoretic, but they 
were not yet abstract. His words suggested that his 
ideas should apply to all sequences of random vari 
ables, not merely ones uniformly distributed, and he 
even considered the case where the variables were 
complex-valued rather than real-valued, but he did not 
step outside the geometric context to consider pro 
bability on abstract spaces. This step was taken by 
Stanislaw Ulam, one of Steinhaus' junior colleagues 
at Lwow. At the International Congress of Mathema 
ticians in Z?rich in 1932, Ulam announced that he 
and another Lwow mathematician, Zbigniew Lomnicki 
(a nephew of Antoni Lomnicki), had shown that pro 
duct measures can be constructed in abstract spaces 
(Ulam, 1932). 
Ulam and Lomnicki's axioms for a measure m were 
simple. We can put them in today's language by sa 
ying that m is a probability measure on a a-algebra 
that is complete (includes all null sets) and contains all 
singletons. Ulam announced that from a countable se 
quence of spaces with such probability measures, one 
can construct a probability measure that satisfies the 
same conditions on the product space. 
We do not know whether Kolmogorov knew about 
Ulam's announcement when he wrote the Grundbe 
griffe. Ulam's axioms would have held no novelty for 
him, but he would presumably have found the result on 
product measures interesting. When it finally appeared, 
Lomnicki and Ulam (1934) listed the same axioms as 
Ulam's announcement had, but it now cited the Grund 
begriffe as authority for them. Kolmogorov (1935) ci 
ted their article in turn in a short list of introductory 
literature in mathematical probability. 
4.4 Cantelli's Abstract Theory 
Like Borel, Castelnuovo and Fr?chet, Francesco 
Paolo Cantelli turned to probability after distinguish 
ing himself in other areas of mathematics. It was only 
in the 1930s, about the same time as the Grundbegriffe 
appeared, that he introduced his own abstract theory 
of probability. This theory, which has important affini 
ties with Kolmogorov's, is developed most clearly in 
an article included in the Grundbegriffen bibliography 
(Cantelli, 1932) and a lecture he gave in 1933 at the 
Institut Henri Poincar? in Paris (Cantelli, 1935). 
Cantelli (1932) argued for a theory that makes no 
appeal to empirical notions such as possibility, event, 
probability or independence. This abstract theory, he 
said, should begin with a set of points that have fi 
nite nonzero measure. This could be any set for which 
measure is defined, perhaps a set of points on a sur 
face. He wrote m(E) for the area of a subset E. He 
noted that m(E\ U E2) = m(E\) + m(E2), provided 
E\ and E2 are disjoint, and 0 < m(E\E2)/m(Ei) < 1 
for / = 1, 2. He called E\ and E2 multipliable when 
m(E\E2) = m(E\)m(E2). Much of probability theory, 
he noted, including Bernoulli's law of large numbers 
and Khinchin's law of the iterated logarithm, can be 
carried out at this abstract level. 
Cantelli (1935) explained how his abstract theory re 
lates to frequencies in the world. The classical calculus 
of probability, he said, should be developed for a parti 
cular class of events in the world in three steps: 
1. Study experimentally the equally likely cases 
(check that they happen equally frequently), thus 
justifying experimentally the rules of total and com 
pound probability. 
2. Develop an abstract theory based only on the 
rules of total and compound probability, without re 
ference to their empirical justification. 
3. Deduce probabilities from the abstract theory and 
use them to predict frequencies. 
His own theory, Cantelli explains, is the one obtained 
in the second step. 
Cantelli's 1932 article and 1933 lecture were not 
really sources for the Grundbegriffe. Kolmogorov's 
earlier work (Kolmogorov, 1929, 1931) had already 
went well beyond anything Cantelli did in 1932, in 
both degree of abstraction and mathematical clarity. 
The 1933 lecture was more abstract, but obviously 
came too late to influence the Grundbegriffe. Howe 
ver, Cantelli did develop independently of Kolmogorov 
the project of combining a frequentist interpretation of 
probability with an abstract axiomatization that retai 
ned in some form the classical rules of total and com 
pound probability. This project had been in the air for 
30 years. 
5. THE GRUNDBEGRIFFE 
The Grundbegriffe was an exposition, not another 
research contribution. In his preface, after acknowl 
edging Fr?chet 's work, Kolmogorov said this: 
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In the pertinent mathematical circles it 
has been common for some time to con 
struct probability theory in accordance with 
this general point of view. But a complete 
presentation of the whole system, free from 
superfluous complications, has been mis 
sing (though a book by Fr?chet, [2] in the 
bibliography, is in preparation). 
Kolmogorov aimed to fill this gap, and he did so bril 
liantly and concisely, in just 62 pages. Fr?chet's much 
longer book, which finally appeared in two volumes 
(Fr?chet, 1937-1938), is regarded by some as a mere 
footnote to Kolmogorov's achievement. 
Fr?chet's own evaluation of the Grundbegriffe's con 
tribution, quoted at the beginning of this article, is cor 
rect so far as it goes. Borel had introduced countable 
additivity into probability in 1909, and in the following 
20 years, many authors, including Kolmogorov, had 
explored its consequences. The Grundbegriffe merely 
rounded out the picture by explaining that nothing 
more was needed. However, Kolmogorov's mathema 
tical achievement, especially his definitive work on the 
classical limit theorems, had given him the grounds and 
the authority to say that nothing more was needed. 
Moreover, Kolmogorov's appropriation of the name 
probability was an important rhetorical achievement, 
with enduring implications. Slutsky in 1922 and 
Kolmogorov himself in 1927 had proposed a gener 
al theory of additive set functions but had relied on 
the classical theory to say that probability should be a 
special case of this general theory. Now Kolmogorov 
proposed axioms for probability. The numbers in his 
abstract theory were probabilities, not merely valences 
or MepLi. His philosophical justification for proceed 
ing in this way so resembled the justification that Borel 
and Levy had given for the classical theory that they 
could hardly take exception. 
It was not really true that nothing more was need 
ed. Those who studied Kolmogorov's formulation in 
detail soon realized that his axioms and definitions 
were inadequate in a number of ways. Most salien 
tly, his treatment of conditional probability was not 
adequate for the burgeoning theory of Markov process 
es. In addition, there were other points in the mo 
nograph where he could not obtain natural results at 
the abstract level and had to fall back to the classi 
cal examples?discrete probabilities and probabilities 
in Euclidean spaces. These shortcomings only gave im 
petus to the new theory, because the project of filling in 
the gaps provided exciting work for a new generation 
of probabilists. 
In this section we take a fresh look at the Grund 
begriffe. We review its six axioms and two ideas that 
were, as Kolmogorov himself pointed out in his pre 
face, novel at the time: the construction of probabilities 
on infinite-dimensional spaces (his famous consistency 
theorem) and the definition of conditional probability 
using the Radon-Nikodym theorem. Then we look at 
the explicitly philosophical part of the monograph: the 
two pages in Chapter I where Kolmogorov explains the 
empirical origin and meaning of his axioms. 
5.1 The Mathematical Framework 
Kolmogorov's six axioms for probability are so fa 
miliar that it seems superfluous to repeat them, but so 
concise that it is easy to do so. We do repeat them 
and then we discuss the two points just mentioned: 
the consistency theorem and the treatment of condi 
tional probability and expectation. As we will see, the 
mathematics was due to earlier authors?Daniell in 
the case of the consistency theorem and Nikodym in 
the case of conditional probabilities and expectations. 
Kolmogorov's contribution, more rhetorical and philo 
sophical than mathematical, was to bring this mathe 
matics into a framework for probability. 
5.1.1 The six axioms, Kolmogorov began with five 
axioms concerning a set E and a set ? of subsets of E, 
which he called random events: 
I. $ is a field of sets. 
II. 5 contains the set E. 
III. To each set A from $ is assigned a nonnegative 
real number P(A). This number P(A) is called the 
probability of the event A. 
IV. TheP(E)=:l. 
V. If A and B are disjoint, then 
P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B). 
He then added a sixth axiom, redundant for finite 5 but 
independent of the first five axioms for infinite $: 
VI. If Ai 2 A2 ~2 
- - * is a decreasing sequence of 
events from ? with H^Li An 
= 0, then 
limn-+ P(An) = 0. 
This is the axiom of continuity. Given the first five ax 
ioms, it is equivalent to countable additivity. 
The six axioms can be summarized by saying that 
P is a nonnegative additive set function in the sense of 
Fr?chet with P(?) = 1. 
Unlike Fr?chet, who had debated countable addi 
tivity with de Finetti (Fr?chet, 1930; de Finetti, 1930; 
Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1996), Kolmogorov did not 
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make a substantive argument for it. Instead, he said this 
(page 14): 
... Since the new axiom is essential only for 
infinite fields of probability, it is hardly pos 
sible to explain its empirical meaning_ 
In describing any actual observable random 
process, we can obtain only finite fields of 
probability. Infinite fields of probability oc 
cur only as idealized models of real random 
processes. This understood, we limit our 
selves arbitrarily to models that satisfy Ax 
iom VI. So far this limitation has been found 
expedient in the most diverse investigations. 
This echoes Borel who adopted countable additi 
vity not as a matter of principle but because he had 
not encountered circumstances where its rejection 
seemed expedient (Borel, 1909a, Section 1.5). How 
ever, Kolmogorov articulated even more clearly than 
Borel the purely instrumental significance of infinity. 
5.1.2 Probability distributions in infinite-dimension 
al spaces. Suppose, using modern terminology, that 
(E\, #i), (?2, #2),... is a sequence of measurable spa 
ces. For each finite set of indices, say i\,... ,in, write 
3*1' '*" for the induced cr-algebra in the product space 
rT|=i Eij- Write E for the product of all the ?/ and 
write 5 for the algebra (not a a-algebra) that con 
sists of all the cylinder subsets of E corresponding to 
elements of the various #M' '*". Suppose we define 
consistent probability measures for all the marginal 
spaces (rT/=i Eij -> SrM'-,Zw). This defines a set function 
on (?,#). Is it countably additive? 
In general, the answer is negative; a counterexample 
was given by Erik Sparre Andersen and B0rge Jessen 
in 1948, but as we noted in Section 4.3, Ulam had 
given a positive answer for the case where the mar 
ginal measures are product measures. Kolmogorov's 
consistency theorem, in Section 4 of Chapter III of 
the Grundbegriffe, gave a positive answer for another 
case, where each E[ is a copy of the real numbers 
and each gv consists of the Borel sets. (Formally, we 
should acknowledge, Kolmogorov had a slightly differ 
ent starting point: finite-dimensional distribution func 
tions, not finite-dimensional measures.) 
In his September 1919 article (Daniell, 1919b), 
Daniell had proven a closely related theorem. Although 
Kolmogorov did not cite Daniell in the Grundbegriffe, 
the essential mathematical content of Kolmogorov's re 
sult is already in Daniell's. This point was recognized 
quickly; Jessen (1935) called attention to Daniell's pri 
ority in an article that appeared in MIT's Journal of 
Mathematics and Physics, together with an article by 
Wiener that also called attention to Daniell's result. In 
a commemoration of Kolmogorov's early work, Doob 
(1989) hazards the guess that Kolmogorov was una 
ware of Daniell's result when he wrote the Grund 
begriffe. This may be true. He would not have been 
the first author to repeat Daniell's work; Jessen had 
presented the result as his own to the Seventh Scan 
dinavian Mathematical Conference in 1929 and had 
become aware of Daniell's priority only in time to ac 
knowledge it in a footnote to his contribution to the 
proceedings (Jessen, 1930). 
It is implausible that Kolmogorov was still unaware 
of Daniell's construction after the comments by Wiener 
and Jessen, but in 1948 he again ignored Daniell while 
claiming the construction of probability measures on 
infinite products as a Soviet achievement (Gnedenko 
and Kolmogorov, 1948, Section 3.1). Perhaps this 
can be dismissed as mere propaganda, but we should 
also remember that the Grundbegriffe was not meant 
as a contribution to pure mathematics. Daniell's and 
Kolmogorov's theorems seem almost identical when 
they are assessed as mathematical discoveries, but they 
differed in context and purpose. Daniell was not think 
ing about probability, whereas the slightly different 
theorem formulated by Kolmogorov was about proba 
bility. Neither Daniell nor Wiener undertook to make 
probability into a conceptually independent branch 
of mathematics by establishing a general method for 
representing it measure-theoretically. 
Kolmogorov's theorem was more general than Dani 
ell's in one respect?Kolmogorov considered an index 
set of arbitrary cardinality, whereas Daniell considered 
only denumerable cardinality. This greater generality is 
merely formal, in two senses: it involves no additional 
mathematical complications and it has no practical use. 
The obvious use of a nondenumerable index would be 
to represent continuous time, and so we might conjec 
ture that Kolmogorov was thinking of making prob 
ability statements about trajectories, as Wiener had 
done in the 1920s. However, Kolmogorov's construc 
tion does not accomplish anything in this direction. 
The a-algebra on the product obtained by the con 
struction contains too few sets; in the case of Brow 
nian motion, it does not include the set of continuous 
trajectories. It took some decades of further research 
to develop general methods of extension to a -algebras 
rich enough to include the infinitary events one typi 
cally wants to discuss (Doob, 1953; Bourbaki, 1994, 
pages 243-245). The topological character of these 
extensions and the failure of the consistency theorem 
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for arbitrary Cartesian products remain two important 
caveats to the Grundbegriffe's thesis that probability is 
adequately represented by the abstract notion of a prob 
ability measure. 
5.1.3 Experiments and conditional probability. In 
the case where A has nonzero probability, Kolmogorov 
defined Pa(B) in the usual way. He called it bedingte 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, which translates into English as 
"conditional probability." Before the Grundbegriffe, 
this term was less common than "relative probability." 
Kolmogorov's treatment of conditional probability 
and expectation was novel. It began with a set-theoretic 
formalization of the concept of an experiment (Ver 
such in German). Here Kolmogorov had in mind a 
subexperiment of the grand experiment defined by the 
conditions 6. The subexperiment may give only limi 
ted information about the outcome ? of the grand ex 
periment. It defines a partition 21 of the sample space 
E for the grand experiment: its outcome amounts to 
specifying which element of 21 contains ?. Kolmogo 
rov formally identified the subexperiment with 21. Then 
he introduced the idea of conditional probability rela 
tive to 21: 
In the finite case, he wrote P%(B) for the random 
variable whose value at each point ? of E is Pa(B), 
where A is the element of 21 that contains ?, and he 
called this random variable the "conditional proba 
bility of B after the experiment 21" (page 12). This 
random variable is well defined for all the ? in ele 
ments of 21 that have positive probability, and these 
? form an event that has probability 1. 
In the general case, he represented the partition 21 by 
a function u on E that induces it and he wrote PU(B) 
for any random variable that satisfies 
P{ucA](B) = E{ucA]Pu(B) 
for every set A of possible values of u such that the 
subset {?|w(?) e A} of E (this is what he meant by 
{u C A}) is measurable and has positive probability 
(page 42). By the Radon-Nikodym theorem (only 
recently proven by Nikodym), this random variable 
is unique up to a set of probability 0. Kolmogorov 
called it the "conditional probability of B with re 
spect to (or knowing) w." He defined Eu(y), which 
he called "the conditional expectation of the variable 
y for a known value of w," analogously (page 46). 
Kolmogorov was doing no new mathematics here; the 
mathematics is Nikodym's. However, Kolmogorov was 
the first to point out that Nikodym's result can be used 
to derive conditional probabilities from absolute prob 
abilities. 
We should not, incidentally, jump to the conclu 
sion that Kolmogorov had abandoned the emphasis on 
transition probabilities he had displayed in his 1931 
article and now wanted to start the study of stochas 
tic processes with unconditional probabilities. Even 
in 1935, he recommended the opposite (Kolmogorov, 
1935, pages 168-169 of the English translation). 
5.1.4 When is conditional probability meaningful? 
To illustrate his understanding of conditional probabi 
lity, Kolmogorov discussed Bertrand's paradox of the 
great circle, which he called, with no specific reference, 
a Borelian paradox. His explanation of the paradox was 
simple but formal. After noting that the probability dis 
tribution for the second point conditional on a particu 
lar great circle is not uniform, he said: 
This demonstrates the inadmissibility of 
the idea of conditional probability with re 
spect to a given isolated hypothesis with 
probability zero. One obtains a probability 
distribution for the latitude on a given great 
circle only when that great circle is consid 
ered as an element of a partition of the entire 
surface of the sphere into great circles with 
the given poles (page 45). 
This explanation has become part of the culture of 
probability theory, but it cannot completely replace the 
more substantive explanations given by Borel. 
Borel insisted that we explain how the measurement 
on which we will condition is to be carried out. This 
accords with Kolmogorov's insistence that a partition 
be specified, because a procedure for measurement will 
determine such a partition. Kolmogorov's explicitness 
on this point was a philosophical advance. On the other 
hand, Borel demanded more than the specification of a 
partition. He demanded that the measurement be speci 
fied realistically enough that we can see partitions into 
events of positive probability, not just a theoretical lim 
iting partition into events of probability 0. 
Borel's demand that we be told how the theoretical 
partition into events of probability 0 arises as a limit 
of partitions into events of positive probability again 
compromises the abstract picture by introducing to 
pological ideas, but this seems to be needed so as to 
rule out nonsense. This point was widely discussed 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Dieudonn? (1948) and Levy 
(1959) gave examples in which the conditional prob 
abilities defined by Kolmogorov do not have versions 
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(fonctions of ? for fixed B) that form sensible prob 
ability measures (when considered as functions of B 
for fixed ?). Gnedenko and Kolmogorov (1949) and 
Blackwell (1956) formulated conditions on measurable 
spaces or probability measures that rule out such exam 
ples. For modern formulations of these conditions, see 
Rogers and Williams (2000). 
5.2 The empirical origin of the axioms 
Kolmogorov devoted about two pages of the Grund 
begriffe to the relation between his axioms and the real 
world. These two pages, a concise statement of Kolmo 
gorov's frequentist philosophy, are so important to our 
story that we quote them in full. We then discuss how 
this philosophy was related to the thinking of his prede 
cessors and how it fared in the decades following 1933. 
5.2.1 In Kolmogorov's own words. Section 2 of 
Chapter I of the Grundbegriffe is titled "Das Verh?lt 
nis zur Erfahrungswelt" It is only two pages in length. 
This subsection consists of a translation of the section 
in its entirety. 
The relation to the world of experience 
The theory of probability is applied to the 
real world of experience as follows: 
1. Suppose we have a certain system of 
conditions 6, capable of unlimited repe 
tition. 
2. We study a fixed circle of phenomena 
that can arise when the conditions & are 
realized. In general, these phenomena 
can come out in different ways in differ 
ent cases where the conditions are rea 
lized. Let E be the set of the different 
possible variants ?i,?2>--- of the out 
comes of the phenomena. Some of these 
variants might actually not occur. We 
include in the set E all the variants we 
regard a priori as possible. 
3. If the variant that actually appears when 
conditions 6 are realized belongs to a set 
A that we define in some way, then we 
say that the event A has taken place. 
Example. The system of conditions 
& consists of flipping a coin twice. The 
circle of phenomena mentioned in point 2 
consists of the appearance, on each flip, 
of heads or tails. It follows that there are 




Consider the event A that there is a repe 
tition. This event consists of the first and 
fourth elementary events. Every event can 
similarly be regarded as a set of elementary 
events. 
4. Under certain conditions, that we will 
not go into further here, we may assume 
that an event A that does or does not oc 
cur under conditions 6 is assigned a real 
number P(A) with the following proper 
ties: 
A. One can be practically certain that 
if the system of conditions 6 is re 
peated a large number of times, n, 
and the event A occurs m times, then 
the ratio m/n will differ only slightly 
from P(A). 
B. If P(A) is very small, then one can 
be practically certain that the event A 
will not occur on a single realization 
of the conditions 6. 
Empirical deduction of the axioms. Usu 
ally one can assume that the system # of 
events A, B,C... that come into consid 
eration and are assigned definite probabili 
ties forms a field that contains E (Axioms 
I and II and the first half of Axiom III?the 
existence of the probabilities). It is further 
evident that 0 < m/n < 1 always holds, so 
that the second half of Axiom III appears 
completely natural. We always have m = n 
for the event ?, so we naturally set P(E) = 
1 (Axiom IV). Finally, if A and B are mu 
tually incompatible (in other words, the sets 
A and B are disjoint), then m ? m\ + m2, 
where m, m\ and m2 are the numbers of 
experiments in which the events A U B, A 
and B happen, respectively. It follows that 
m m\ m2 
n n n 
So it appears appropriate to set P(A U B) ? 
P(A) + P(B). 
Remark I. If two assertions are both 
practically certain, then the assertion that 
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they are simultaneously correct is practi 
cally certain, though with a little lower 
degree of certainty. But if the number of as 
sertions is very large, we cannot draw any 
conclusion whatsoever about making the as 
sertions simultaneously from the practical 
certainty of each of them individually. So 
it in no way follows from Principle A that 
m/n will differ only a little from P(A) in 
every one of a very large number of series 
of experiments, where each series consists 
of n experiments. 
Remark II. By our axioms, the impos 
sible event (the empty set) has the probabil 
ity P(0) = 0. But the converse inference, 
from P(A) = 0 to the impossibility of A, 
does not by any means follow. By Princi 
ple B, the event A's having probability zero 
implies only that it is practically impossible 
that it will happen on a particular unrepe 
ated realization of the conditions 6. This 
by no means implies that the event A will 
not appear in the course of a sufficiently 
long series of experiments. When P(A) = 0 
and n is very large, we can only say, by 
Principle A, that the quotient m/n will be 
very small?it might, for example, be equal 
to l/n. 
5.2.2 The philosophical synthesis. The philosophy 
set out in the two pages we have just translated is a syn 
thesis, combining elements of the German and French 
traditions. 
By his own testimony, Kolmogorov drew first and 
foremost from von Mises. In a footnote, he put the mat 
ter this way: 
... In laying out the assumptions needed to 
make probability theory applicable to the 
world of real events, the author has fol 
lowed in large measure the model provided 
by Mr. von Mises 
... 
The very title of this section of the Grundbegriffe, "Das 
Verh?ltnis zur Erfahrungswelt," echoes the title of the 
passage in von Mises (1931) that Kolmogorov cites? 
"Das Verh?ltnis der Theorie zur Erfahrungswelt"? 
but Kolmogorov does not discuss collectives. As he 
explained in a letter to Fr?chet in 1939, he thought 
only a finitary version of this concept would reflect 
experience truthfully, and a finitary version, unlike 
von Mises' infinitary version, could not be made math 
ematically rigorous. So for mathematics, one should 
adopt an axiomatic theory "whose practical value can 
be deduced directly" from a finitary concept of collec 
tives. 
Although collectives are in the background, Kolmo 
gorov starts in a way that echoes Chuprov more than 
von Mises. He writes, as Chuprov (1910, page 149) 
did, of a system of conditions (Komplex von Bedin 
gungen in German; komiuickc ycjiOBHii in Russian). 
Probability is relative to a system of conditions 6, and 
yet further conditions must be satisfied in order for 
events to be assigned a probability under 6. Kolmogo 
rov says nothing more about these conditions, but we 
may conjecture that he was thinking of the three sour 
ces of probabilities mentioned by von Mises: gambling 
devices, statistical phenomena and physical theory. 
Where do von Mises' two axioms?probability as a 
limit of relative frequency and its invariance under se 
lection of subsequences?appear in Kolmogorov's ac 
count? Principle A is obviously a finitary version of 
von Mises' axiom that identifies probability as the limit 
of relative frequency. Principle B, on the other hand, 
is the strong form of Cournot's principle (see Sec 
tion 2.2.2 above). Is it a finitary version of von Mises' 
principle of invariance under selection? Evidently. In 
a collective, von Mises says, we have no way to sin 
gle out an unusual infinite subsequence. One finitary 
version of this is that we have no way to single out an 
unusual single trial. It follows that when we do select 
a single trial (a single realization of the conditions ?, 
as Kolmogorov puts it), we should not expect anything 
unusual. In the special case where the probability is 
very small, the usual is that the event will not happen. 
Of course, Principle B, like Principle A, is only sat 
isfied when there is a collective, that is, under certain 
conditions. Kolmogorov's insistence on this point is 
confirmed by the comments we quoted in Section 2.2.2 
herein on the importance and nontriviality of the step 
from 
"usually" to "in this particular case." 
As Borel and Levy had explained so many times, 
Principle A can be deduced from Principle B togeth 
er with Bernoulli's theorem, which is a consequence 
of the axioms. In the framework that Kolmogorov sets 
up, however, the deduction requires an additional as 
sumption: we must assume that Principle B applies 
not only to the probabilities specified for repetitions 
of conditions 6, but also to the corresponding prob 
abilities (obtaining by assuming independence) for re 
petitions of n-fold repetitions of 6. It is not clear 
that this additional assumption is appropriate, not only 
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because we might hesitate about independence (see 
Shiryaev's comments on page 120 of the third Russian 
edition of the Grundbegriffe, published in 1998), but 
also because the enlargement of our model to n-fold re 
petitions might involve a deterioration in its empirical 
precision to the extent that we are no longer justified in 
treating its high-probability predictions as practically 
certain. Perhaps these considerations justify Kolmogo 
rov's presenting Principle A as an independent princi 
ple alongside Principle B rather than as a consequence 
of it. 
Principle A has an independent role in Kolmogorov's 
story, however, even if we do regard it as a consequence 
of Principle B together with Bernoulli's theorem, be 
cause it comes into play at a point that precedes the 
adoption of the axioms and hence the derivation of Ber 
noulli's theorem: it is used to motivate the axioms (cf. 
Bartlett, 1949). The parallel to the thinking of Levy is 
striking. In Levy's picture, the notion of equally like 
ly cases motivates the axioms, while Cournot's princi 
ple links the theory with reality. The most important 
change Kolmogorov makes in this picture is to replace 
equally likely cases with frequency; frequency now 
motivates the axioms, but Cournot's principle remains 
the most essential link with reality. 
In spite of the obvious influence of Borel and Levy, 
Kolmogorov cites only von Mises in this section of 
the Grundbegriffe. Philosophical works by Borel and 
Levy, along with those by Slutsky and Cantelli, do ap 
pear in the Grundbegriffen bibliography, but their ap 
pearance is explained only by a sentence in the preface: 
"The bibliography gives some recent works that sho 
uld be of interest from a foundational viewpoint." The 
emphasis on von Mises may have been motivated in 
part by political prudence. Whereas Borel and Levy 
persisted in speaking of the subjective side of proba 
bility, von Mises was an uncompromising frequentist. 
Whereas Chuprov and Slutsky worked in economics 
and statistics, von Mises was an applied mathemati 
cian, concerned more with aerodynamics than social 
science, and the relevance of his work on collectives 
to physics had been established in the Soviet litera 
ture by Khinchin (1929; see also Khinchin, 1961, and 
Siegmund-Schultze, 2004). (For more on the politi 
cal context, see Blum and Mespoulet, 2003; Lorentz, 
2002; Mazliak, 2003; Seneta, 2004.) 
5.2.3 Why was Kolmogorov's philosophy not more 
influential? Although Kolmogorov never abandoned 
his formulation of frequentism, his philosophy has not 
enjoyed the enduring popularity of his axioms. Sec 
tion 2 of Chapter I of the Grundbegriffe is seldom quo 
ted. Cournot's principle remained popular in Europe 
during the 1950s (Shafer and Vovk, 2005), but never 
gained substantial traction in the United States. 
The lack of interest in Kolmogorov's philosophy 
during the past half century can be explained in many 
ways, but one important factor is the awkwardness of 
extending it to stochastic processes. The first condition 
in Kolmogorov's credo is that the system of conditions 
should be capable of unlimited repetition. When we 
define a stochastic process in terms of transition prob 
abilities, as in Kolmogorov (1931), this condition may 
be met, for it may be possible to start a system repeat 
edly in a given state, but when we focus on probabili 
ties for sets of possible trajectories, we are in a more 
awkward position. In many applications, there is only 
one realized trajectory; it is not possible to repeat the 
experiment to obtain another. Kolmogorov managed to 
overlook this tension in the Grundbegriffe, where he 
showed how to represent a discrete-time Markov chain 
in terms of a single probability measure (Chapter I, 
Section 6), but did not give such representations for 
continuous stochastic processes. It became more dif 
ficult to ignore the tension after Doob and others suc 
ceeded in giving such representations. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Seven decades later, the Grundbegriffen mathemati 
cal ideas still set the stage for mathematical probability. 
Its philosophical ideas, especially Cournot's principle, 
also remain powerful, even for those who want to go 
beyond the measure-theoretic framework (Shafer and 
Vovk, 2001). As we have tried to show in this article, 
the endurance of these ideas is not due to Kolmogo 
rov's originality. Rather, it is due to the presence of the 
ideas in the very fabric of the work that came before. 
The Grundbegriffe was a product of its own time. 
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